Freedom within Nature by O'Connor, Brian
1  
Freedom within Nature: Adorno on the Idea of Reason’s Autonomy* 
Brian O’Connor (School of Philosophy) 
 
Introduction 
A commitment to the thesis of the autonomy of reason can be located across various 
phases of German Idealism. Initiated in Kant’s critical work, it developed diverse 
conceptualizations and functions in the philosophy of Fichte’s Jena period, early 
Schelling and, arguably, all of Hegel’s mature writings. For Kant the self-governance 
of reason was to mean, at the practical level, that rational agents could determine 
themselves through reason alone. To do so they would endorse principles for action, 
these principles taking the form of a law compelling for all rational beings. As 
materially pure, universal laws, practical principles were valid independently of the 
normative authority of existing socio-cultural practice and of the pathological and 
wholly subjective preferences of any given empirical agent. The rational agent, 
through the use of autonomous reason, could both identify what a rational will should 
will and be at the same time moved to act upon what it wills.1 Kant’s theory of reason 
offered a framework within which practical reason itself could be defended, and 
theories that privileged sentiment, happiness or any other variety of affective motive 
were exposed as antithetical to moral legislation.  
 
For Kant it was not only practical reason that was capable of autonomy, that is, of 
providing us with laws that are independent of empirical causality. The very practice 
of philosophy itself – of theoretical reason – was to be reconceived as an exercise of 
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autonomous reason. Without reference to experience it was supposed to be possible 
for reason to identify its own capacities and limitations. It could establish the different 
kinds of governance reason brings to bear on the various regions of concern to it. The 
limit points of reason were revealed when reason recognized its own contradictoriness 
within particular domains. Philosophy, construed in this new form, might be 
considered as reason’s own self-explication. 
 
Among the philosophers who succeeded Kant theoretical reason was set to validating 
the fundamental claims of human knowledge, on purely conceptual considerations, in 
order to provide those claims with a security they did not apparently possess when 
conceived within their separable, original empirical disciplines. These claims, if they 
were claims of reason, could be understood as elements or moments of reason’s own 
system.  
 
Autonomous practical and theoretical reason were not to be understood as distinct 
rationalities. Implicit in the very idea of reason’s autonomy – i.e. its capacity to 
endorse principles in independence from empirical criteria – is, according to the 
idealists, its unity. There is not one faculty of reason for philosophy and another for 
morality: it is one and the same reason applying itself in differing ways depending on 
what it chooses to analyze. The theory of the basis of that unity can take different 
directions: practical or theoretical reasons might be seen as derivations of each other 
(giving rise to claims about the primacy of either practical or theoretical reason) or as 
belonging to a single substance.  
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The appealing historical precept that human beings have an entitlement to make new 
and emancipating social arrangements in independence from existing sources of 
authority, habit or tradition was bolstered by the idealists’ insights into reason’s 
autonomy. Politics and theory were implicit partners. The interest in the autonomy of 
reason for the sake of human freedom was, though, to recede sharply in the period of 
post-idealist philosophy, with history and philosophy playing their parts in 
complicating the classical ideals of emancipation. It is through the development of 
critical theory, in explicit negotiation with the legacy of idealism, that this distinctive 
interest regained philosophical attention. For critical theory, the capacity of human 
beings to create a rational society – one in which antagonism, want and institutionally 
generated suffering are absent – depends on our capacity to reason without the 
determinations of social normativity, that is, autonomously. 
 
The autonomy of reason, critical theory maintains, is imperilled by the forces of 
prevailing intellectual conventions. Reason loses its connection with emancipation 
and instead is turned towards the exigencies of successful management within 
existing institutional life. The idealists believed that their account of the autonomy of 
reason could promote the development of a capacity that human beings had, in the 
main, lacked the confidence to exercise. The critical theorists, however, found 
themselves in a quite different environment. The concept and value of reason was 
well understood, but, tragically, it was the wrong notion of reason – instrumental, 
manipulative, strategic – that had taken hold. The critical theorists did not recommend 
a return to the classical formulations of reason’s autonomy as a solution to the 
problem of reason’s current limitations. In fact, those formulations had in certain 
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respects reproduced developing social practices of reason: the control of ‘natural’ 
being, including human being.  
 
Early critical theory’s preoccupation with providing a defensible account of reason’s 
autonomy – one which at the same time specifically rejects the formulations of the 
idealist tradition – has been obscured by the ferocity of that movement’s criticism of 
reason in general. Adorno and Horkheimer’s sweeping indictment of the dialectic of 
enlightenment – the charge that every effort to lift ourselves from nature appears to 
entail nature’s destruction – might lead us to suppose that early critical theory is 
eager, in sympathy with Nietzsche, to expose the motives and, thereby, inherent 
heteronomy of reason. It appears to be, in other words, an effort to undermine the very 
principle of the autonomy of reason. Arguably the force of their rhetorically coloured 
argument leads irrevocably to that conclusion. But this cannot be critical theory’s 
intention, at least. Were it so, criticisms of the distortion of reason and the attendant 
irrationality of society (it produces antagonism, want and suffering while proclaiming 
freedom) would be groundless (at least in terms of ‘rationality’) since there would be 
no way of taking a normative stance, based on ‘true’ reason, against them. What 
critical theory actually attempts is to offer ways of thinking about human experience 
that can explain our capacity to take a reflective view of that experience without also 
holding that reflection separates us from experience’s natural basis. 
 
In drawing out the relationship between German idealism and critical theory on the 
question of reason’s autonomy I will concentrate on Adorno’s criticisms of 
transcendental idealism as it is the most sustained and detailed discussion within the 
critical theory tradition of the autonomy of reason. These criticisms open up for 
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Adorno the conceptual space within which a more inclusive account reason’s 
autonomy might be articulated. The next section of this paper will turn to that 
criticism and a consideration of the new theoretical direction that the critique seems to 
necessitate – the direction Adorno attempts – will follow. 
 
Criticisms of the Transcendental Theory 
Adorno’s various criticisms of Kant’s notion of the autonomy of reason attempt to 
reveal the limitations and implicit dangers of that notion when conceived purely 
within the terms of idealism. Idealism articulated in a revolutionary manner the power 
of reason to free us from authority, but its theoretical basis actually narrowed what the 
exercise of freedom was to be. At the centre of this difficulty, according to Adorno, is 
the fundamental opposition between reason and freedom on the one side and nature 
on the other. This opposition detaches reason from, Adorno will try to show, its 
natural basis. His criticisms concentrate on three main issues, to be considered in turn 
in this section: autonomous agency as coercion, the unity and heteronomy of reason, 
and reason as ontology. 
 
The worry about transcendental idealism’s opposition between reason/freedom and 
nature can be found within the history of German Idealism itself. The respective 
Naturphilosophien developed by Schelling and Hegel seek to address the explanatory 
insufficiency of the concept of nature permitted by transcendental idealism. The latter 
was perceived to have reduced nature to product, to what mind or reason had made 
(natura naturata) and thereby to have neglected the question of nature’s own 
productivity (natura naturans). Conceived solely as natura naturata, Schelling 
argued, nature was deprived of its dynamic and converted into ‘absolute rest’ (absolute 
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Ruhe).2 Furthermore, the physical actuality of reality itself came, implausibly, to be 
posited purely as an act of the subject. Transcendental idealism, Schelling argued, 
would have to be reinterpreted as an explanation of one side of experience only, 
namely, of our productive capacities. Beside that explanation a philosophy of nature 
would have to be placed in order, as he wrote, ‘to explain the ideal by means of the 
real. Hence, the two sciences form a unity, and differ only in the opposing 
orientations of their tasks. Furthermore, not only are the two directions equally 
possible, they are equally necessary, and hence both receive the same necessity in the 
system of knowledge’.3 This endeavour to identify the unity of reason/freedom and 
nature was also to be pursued by Hegel. In the Encyclopaedia, he argues that nature 
like spirit has its own history of development, a history which parallels that of the 
development of spirit. Far from being ‘dead’ and animated solely by human 
consciousness nature, he writes, ‘is to be regarded as a system of stages, one arising 
necessarily from the other and being the proximate truth of the stage from which it 
results: but it is not generated naturally out of the other but only in the inner Idea 
which constitutes the ground of Nature’.4 It may be arguable that Schelling and Hegel 
respectively represent challenging responses to the inevitably inert conception of 
nature framed by transcendental idealism. But viewed from within the critical 
concerns of Adorno – who refers hardly at all to the Naturphilosophie – it is 
continuous with what it attempted to succeed in that it is an effort to conceive nature 
as something which can be systematized. He peremptorily dismisses Hegel’s work on 
nature and natural beauty as ‘virtually unreflected partisanship for subjective spirit’.5 
The ‘spirit’ supposedly at work in nature – what it is that licences the task of 
reconstructing its inner system – is an anthropomorphism. As we shall see in more 
detail below, Adorno holds that nature, of which we are a part, is not translatable into 
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the language of reason. Hence the symmetry of reason in nature and nature in reason 
is, for him, excluded from the start. 
 
For the most part Adorno proceeds not by criticizing Kant’s position by the measure 
of his own presumed account of reason’s autonomy. Rather he attempts to read Kant’s 
position immanently. This involves an examination of the conclusions that Kant 
wishes to establish and the concepts that are deployed in developing that conclusion. 
Adorno will find that contradictions appear, and inevitably so given the impossibility 
of realizing the intention in its idealist form. The lessons that are drawn from these 
difficulties guide Adorno in determining the parameters within which a space for a 
new account of reason’s autonomy is to be developed. This approach indicates the 
significance for Adorno of Kant’s endeavour. In criticizing Kant Adorno understands 
himself to be engaging with the exemplary articulation of idealism’s conception of the 
autonomy of reason: if that conception ultimately fails then it is symptomatic of 
idealism’s failure, on this point, as a whole. 
 
The central significance of Kant’s thesis for Adorno is that it attempts to give 
foundation to the idea that human beings are capable of reflective engagements with 
immediacy (ND 221 / GS 6: 220).6 By immediacy is meant anything which serves as 
a quasi-natural trigger for action, and that includes those forms of life that have taken 
on the character of what critical theory thinks of as ‘second nature’: in particular, the 
norms of our institutionalized existences, the blind application of manipulating forms 
of reason. The autonomy of reason implies that we have the possibility of 
withstanding and in that specific sense placing ourselves outside the conditioning of 
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these forms of immediacy. That is the principle, though it is faced with a difficult 
reality.  
 
In the era of what Adorno the Frankfurt School identify as ‘late capitalism’ reason’s 
autonomy has become problematic. Capitalism, it is claimed, does not merely 
structure the exchange of goods, it influences all forms of interaction, thereby 
reducing them to acts of strategic calculation. Agents manipulate themselves and 
others in order to succeed within this system. Even love, Adorno believes, does not 
escape that conditioning. In Minima Moralia, following Proust, he writes: ‘The 
exchange relationship that love partially withstood throughout the bourgeois age has 
completely absorbed it; the last immediacy falls victim to the distance of all the 
contracting parties from all others. Love is chilled by the value that the ego places on 
itself’.7 In this environment reason is anything but autonomous: it is the mechanism of 
negotiating intra-institutional life, never a critical attitude towards the norms that 
allow capitalism to be experienced as second nature. 
 
In ways Adorno’s identification of late capitalism as a destructive dynamic falls 
within a longstanding the form of social criticism: that the human capacity for reason 
or wisdom is compromised by the independence sapping influences of the collective 
ideas of the mob or of the priests or of the system. But there is a further claim in 
Adorno’s position that separates it from social criticism in that perennial form. 
Whereas conventional criticism attempts to identify the ways in which reason is 
suffocated by powerful social forces Adorno argues that reason itself is vulnerable to 
unreasonableness. Human beings can live by means of a model of reason, valorize it 
and order the world according to it, but yet the model may be destructive. He holds 
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that the very notion of reason’s primacy comes with this danger, that it can position 
itself as ‘taming, suppressing, ordering and governing whatever is unreasonable, 
instead of absorbing it into itself in a spirit of reconciliation’.8 Adorno theorizes this 
problem as what he calls, following Lukács, the phenomenon of reification 
(Verdinglichung). 
 
Reification is a state of affairs in which there are only quantitative and therefore 
mutually translatable differences within and between objects. Adorno believes this is 
typical of the scientific ‘mode of procedure’ (Verfahrungsweisen) (ND 233, 
translation emended / GS 6: 232), but it now reaches outside scientific processes of 
the classification of nature and into the space of everyday judgments about how one 
should act and how we are to think about other people. Differentiations between 
objects are established by reference to the preconceived conceptualizations of human 
beings acting on those things. This behaviour excludes the possibility of surprise at 
the distinctive character of particular objects. It gains its grip on us because, as 
Adorno puts it, we forget what objects really are. As he explained in a letter to Walter 
Benjamin, an explanation later echoed in Dialektik der Aufklärung: ‘For all reification 
is a forgetting: objects become purely thing-like the moment they are retained for us 
without the continued presence of their other aspects: when something of them has 
been forgotten’.9 Theories that take consistency as a criterion of reason are reified. 
According to Adorno they place ‘logical stringency’ (ND 233) over experience of the 
complexity of objects, a complexity that must be ‘forgotten’ for that stringency to 
succeed. Under these conditions, Adorno writes, the ‘autonomy of reason vanishes: 
the part of reason that exceeds the subordinate reflection upon and adjustment to pre-
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given data’.10 Acts of reason, in other words, are limited in advance by what is to 
count as reasonable. 
 
Autonomous agency as coercion. Adorno understands reifying judgments as a kind of 
coercion, a coercion he finds reproduced by idealism’s autonomous reason. The word 
he generally uses to capture the manner in which these judgments act on objects is 
‘Zwang’, and from its range of connotations – which include compulsion and 
constraint – it is that of coercion that is emphasized. As coercion it is violence against 
objects but also against self. That Zwang and reification are conceptually related for 
Adorno means that knowledge as Zwang is itself a kind of forgetting. Thought begins 
its engagement with objects by fitting them into patterns that are familiar. In this 
respect objects are made into something they are not, but that should be only the 
beginning of knowledge: ‘without a coercive moment there could be no thinking’ 
(ND 233 / GS 6: 232).11 Idealism, however, conceives knowledge wholly within this 
structure. Because it locates the autonomy of reason in the subject alone it excludes 
the possibility of an account of how we can proceed beyond the coercive moment 
with which thinking begins. 
 
Hegel’s idealism is accused of placing priority on the systematization of knowledge 
over experience. With the assumption that the fundamental principles of reality as the 
products of reason must somehow fit together Hegel forces, Adorno alleges, reality 
into a system.12 Contrary to Hegel’s claim that the system simply unfolds as 
necessitated by the objects under consideration, Adorno argues, the ‘Hegelian system 
in itself was not a true becoming; implicitly, each single definition in it was already 
preconceived. Such safeguards condemn it to untruth’ (ND 27 / GS 6: 38).13 Kant too 
11  
is accused of distorting experience by operating with a system. However it is his 
notion of freedom as causality that, for Adorno, marks out its distinctive form of 
coerciveness. 
 
Adorno critically considers Kant’s claim that reason conceived as a ‘lawmaking 
power’ converts freedom into ‘a “special sort of causality”’ (ND 255 / GS 6: 252).14 
Kant is trying to convey the efficaciousness of practical reason. It can determine the 
will and thereby produce an effect in the world. Kant’s position makes appeal to 
consciousness or reason as possessing causal power of some kind. The obvious 
strangeness of that idea has prompted alternative models of action which attempt to 
avoid the language and logic of causality altogether.15 Certainly – as we shall see 
further on – Adorno is concerned by the dualism implicit in this theory of action. His 
primary criticism, though, is the relationship of subject (agent) to object (others, 
nature) to which the model of freedom as causality is committed. As causality reason, 
the highest exercise of freedom, is not conceived as the power to act and react. In 
principle, the idea of the exercise of reason as efficient causality need not suggest 
coercion (violence done to the non-agent). It is simply the intentional action of the 
agent. Adorno’s claim, though, is that the Kantian conception rigidifies the 
relationship of the agent towards the world and narrows its self-understanding of what 
kind of action is available to it to the resources of its own rationality. This turns out to 
be the business of imposing form on a world which is not made in the form of reason 
the agent assumes (i.e. the thing-in-itself, our pathological character). And the 
autonomy of reason grants the agent this relationship to the object, Adorno argues, as 
affecting objects but not being affected by them: it is not response, but the power to 
make objects what the subject’s reason deems them to be. He writes: 
12  
 
Freed from the compulsion of identity (Identitätszwang), thinking might perhaps 
dispense with causality, which is made in the image of that compulsion. Causality 
hypostatizes the form, as binding upon a content which on its own would not 
assume that form… (ND 234 / GS 6: 232)16 
 
Adorno establishes the charge that transcendental practical philosophy is in some 
respect a violence against experience by reading Kant’s notion of Zwang in a 
particular and obviously contentious way. Kant conceives Zwang as a freely adopted 
constraint which the rational being places on the urgings of his/her sensuous being. In 
the second Critique he writes: 
 
As submission to a law, that is, as a command (indicating constraint [Zwang]) for 
the sensuously affected subject), it therefore contains in it no pleasure but instead, 
so far, displeasure in the action. On the other hand, however, since this constraint 
is exercised only by the lawgiving of his own reason, it also contains something 
elevating’.17 
 
It is elevating in that the subject can now ‘cognize himself’ as ‘free’. Kant, as we have 
just seen, admits that the experience of Zwang is not always an agreeable one 
regardless of the freedom of choice through which the rational agent came to adopt 
this constraint. It is always – it seems – aimed against the agent’s pathological 
inclinations and tendencies toward self-love. Appropriately, the source of this Zwang, 
Kant claims, is ‘intellectual’.18 Viewed in one way Kant’s proposal appears common-
sensical: when an individual determines a course of action that individual now has a 
13  
reason to self-deny attractive opportunities which may be diversions from that course. 
Yet what Kant is proposing does not disallow the presence of a peculiar misery in the 
adoption of a self-constraint, of going against what one might want to do and feeling 
necessitation to undertake, as he writes, ‘what one does not altogether like to do’.19 
Clearly, acting in this way is not equivalent to acting against one’s will, as in 
situations of coercion. At the same time, one must go against some part of one’s will 
in order to be autonomous. Within this Kantian conception of moral motivations the 
authority of reason is to win in the end over the authority of sensuousness. 
 
It is noteworthy that Kant elsewhere expresses the tension between Zwang and 
freedom in a way that might even serve to bring into question the value of Zwang. In 
the first Critique he describes the discipline of pure reason as Zwang, contrasting it 
with culture as a space of self-realization. He writes: 
 
The compulsion (Zwang) through which the constant propensity to stray from 
certain rules is eliminated and finally eradicated is called discipline. It is different 
from culture, which would merely produce a skill without first canceling out 
another one that is already present. In the formation of a talent, therefore, which 
already has by itself a tendency to expression, discipline will make a negative 
contribution, but culture a positive.20 
 
While it would be wrong to interpret Zwang here as connoting the fettering 
experience of coercion it does appear, nevertheless, to indicate a negatively restrictive 
experience. Whereas ‘culture’, which follows no necessary course, permits the 
development of our abilities, discipline produces rigour in our knowledge and protects 
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us from error. Discipline as Zwang sits uneasily with the variety of freedom that is 
exemplified in working outside rules. It therefore involves what Kant, in the second 
Critique, refers laconically to as ‘some sacrifice (Aufopferung)’.21 
 
It is this range of thoughts, in which Zwang signifies a kind of imposition on an object 
that is in some sense unwilling, that underpins Adorno’s reading of Kant’s notion of 
Zwang generally. The world, including the whole human being, is formed after the 
image of order or lawlikeness that is the particular definition of reason in Kant’s 
philosophy. Freedom, which is not the experience of action without planning (or 
discipline) becomes instead the unilateral power of the agent to be the cause of its 
objects. Adorno writes: 
 
The Kantian freedom means the same as pure practical reason, the producer of its 
own objects; this, we are told [by Kant], has to do ‘not with objects or their 
cognition, but with its own faculty to make those objects real (in line with their 
cognition)’. (ND 255-6 / GS 6: 252-3)22 
 
Adorno interprets Kant’s claim here to imply that the supposed causality at work in 
these acts of construction is rather straightforwardly a process of domination. He 
continues: ‘The absolute volitional autonomy implied therein would be the same as 
absolute rule of one’s inner nature’ (ND 256 / GS 6: 253).23 In essence, the role of 
reason is to suppress the impulse for action and instead create motivations for action 
out of reason. This suppression creates a particular type of human being by selecting 
as that which elevates us that part of our capacities that can conform to lawlikeness: 
pure reason. 
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Adorno explores not only the relationship between Zwang as causality and freedom 
but between the very notion of freedom as causality and the terms of the Kantian 
division of reality. Kant presents us with two spaces within which to place the totality 
of the agent’s motivations and actions, namely within the world of appearance – the 
phenomenal world – or that of freedom – the noumenal world. Adorno argues that 
Kant’s notion of freedom as causality cannot be placed within either option without 
collapsing that notion. The option of noumenality is to be excluded, Adorno argues – 
expressing a familiar worry – because a noumenal agent could not be intelligibly 
conceived as having purchase on the phenomenal world. This means that a theory of 
noumenal causality must be rejected in principle. It leaves the agent outside a space in 
which action is possible. If this notion is nevertheless to be maintained it generates 
only what Adorno sees as subjectification: ‘The semblance of a noumenal objectivity 
of practical reason establishes its complete subjectification; it is no longer clear how 
its intervention across the ontological abyss may reach anything that is at all’ (ND 237 
/ GS 6: 235).24 This conception of the noumenality of autonomous practical reason, 
Adorno argues, actually depracticalizes the agent. Reason is explicable in 
independence of objects, but what can reason be about if it needs no reference to 
objects – to complex states of affairs – to which it might react and respond? We can 
find some support for Adorno’s worry by turning to a distinction Kant himself makes 
in the second Critique between choices grounded in autonomous reason and those 
grounded in heteronomy. The former, it seems, are straightforwardly apparent, 
whereas the latter – perhaps in the manner of phronetic practical reason – require 
experience. Kant writes: 
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What is to be done in accordance with the principle of the autonomy of choice is 
seen quite easily and without hesitation by the most common understanding; what 
is to be done on the presupposition of heteronomy of choice is difficult to see and 
requires knowledge of the world.25 
 
The effective practicality of the agent is understood purely in terms of formal reason. 
The very idea, according to Adorno’s interpretation, is paradoxical: it is ‘that 
absolutely sovereign reason which is to have the capacity to work empirically 
irrespective of experience and irrespective of the leap between action and deed’ (ND 
236 / GS 6: 235).26 
 
The notion of phenomenal causality is also problematic, though for quite different 
reasons. Kant does not want, of course, the causality of the autonomous agent to be 
phenomenal as this would place the agent wholly within the space of empirical 
causality. But Adorno holds that this commitment as implicit in Kant’s understanding 
of how the agent acts. For Adorno, as we have seen, Kant’s theory of autonomy 
entails action in the world, by an agent in the world against the objects of the world. 
In this regard Kant follows, without realizing it, the growing conception of human 
beings as rational by measure of their capacity to master nature. There is nothing in 
this conception which elevates the subject outside the world of appearances. Adorno 
concludes: ‘what the aporetical construction of freedom rests upon is not the 
noumenal but the phenomenal… it is naked compulsion, exerted in space and time’ 
(ND 255 / GS 6: 252-3).27  
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The unity and heteronomy of reason. The idealists take the claim that reason is unified 
as a corollary of its autonomy. Were it without unity there would be separate 
rationalities, a conclusion which could be reached only by ignoring the analogous 
roles played by reason in its separate domains. Adorno criticizes this notion as it 
effectively insists that reason can be conceived in separation from the realities with 
which it is engaged. Autonomous reason, Adorno charges, is construed as a unity only 
by rendering it into a meaningless abstraction, ‘purified of all externality’ (von allem 
Äußeren Getrenntes).28 The parts of the world to which philosophical reason directs 
itself – materiality – do not exert any influence on the operating principle of that 
reason. Adorno reports Kant’s claim for that unity as follows: 
 
The terminologically suggested difference between pure theoretical and pure 
practical doctrine; the difference between a formally logical and a 
transcendentally logical doctrine; finally the difference of the doctrine of ideas in 
the narrow sense – these are not differences within reason in itself. They are solely 
differences concerning its application, said either to have nothing to do with 
objects or to refer to the possibility of objects pure and simple, or – like practical 
reason – to create its objects, the free acts, out of itself. (ND 234 / GS 6: 233)29 
 
The very definition of unity in this sense, however, is unsustainable. How could it 
explain even the different applications of the same reason; that is, what would induce 
the exercise of practical reason in one context but not in another? If there is a 
distinction between theoretical reason, practical reason and even reason in its 
teleological employments (the third Critique) that distinction must, Adorno claims, 
refer to its regions of application and the experience the agent is attempting to 
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negotiate. In this case, however, ‘the subdivision of reason by objects makes it 
depend, contrary to the doctrine of autonomy, on the extrarational it is supposed not to 
be’ (ND 235 / GS 6: 234).30 In other words, the unity of reason, of different functions 
of reason, must always point towards the world itself in order to make sense of the 
different interests it possesses (normative or theoretical). This disrupts the claim to 
unity, though, in that it reveals, according to Adorno, ‘reason’s inner dependence 
upon what is not identical with it’ (ND 235 / GS 6: 234)31, i.e. the objects it attempts 
to order and form. He also refers to the material with which reason is engaged as ‘a 
condition of its [reason’s] own possibility’ (ND 243 / GS 6: 241). This clearly erodes 
the basis of the claims for reason’s absolute autonomy. The extrarational as a 
condition of reason’s application would, Adorno argues, ‘make it [reason] 
heteronomous’ (ND 243 / GS 6: 241). 
 
That flamboyant conclusion does not specify whether reason’s formal processes are 
affected by the objects to which it is applied. Of course, Adorno believes objects 
affect reason in that way: he is a consistent critic of formalism. But if Kant does not – 
and the reading is immanent – then it is possible to maintain that it is one and the 
same reason even in its diverse applications. There are various options available in 
interpreting what Kant actually intends by the notion of reason’s unity. Pauline 
Kleingeld notes: 
 
it seems that Kant defends three incompatible claims regarding the unity of 
reason. It would seem that he cannot consistently hold at the same time that (1) 
theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, 
(2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that they are united.32  
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It is the material of claim (1) that Adorno had taken as his text for unity of reason. In 
the conclusion of her analysis, to cite its first part, Kleingeld writes: 
 
Kant’s three claims about the unity of reason are consistent. The claim that 
theoretical and practical reason are one and the same faculty, merely applied 
differently, should be seen as a regulative principle based on reason’s own interest 
in systematicity, and not as a claim to knowledge.33 
 
Adorno’s line of argument diverges from Kleingeld’s minimalist account. Adorno 
holds that Kant is committed to prioritizing the principles of autonomy and unity of 
reason over the capacity of the world to inform the activities of reason. And he also 
wants to claim, in contrast to Kleingeld, that reason for Kant is an act of 
constructivism directed towards the world: it is therefore tied to knowledge. In other 
words, the interest in systematicity is at the same time, in Adorno’s interpretation, an 
interest in knowledge purely from within reason’s own competence. 
 
Reason as ontology. That last charge leads us to Adorno’s claim that, on the basis of 
the autonomy and unity of reason, Kant grants the rational agent implicit total 
possession of objectivity. Reason is inscribed in the subject alone, not in its actions, as 
these must refer to states-of-affairs outside the subject. The special capacity of the 
agent to judge or act autonomously is intelligible in independence from the empirical, 
historical contexts in which those judgments or actions are undertaken. Reason for 
Kant, Adorno maintains, is (a1) (my numeration) ‘the pure form of subjectivity’ (ND 
234 / GS 6: 233). (It is difficult to know what part exactly of Kant’s philosophy is 
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being referred to by Adorno in that proposition.) But according to Adorno there is a 
further dimension to Kant’s notion of reason: namely, anything which can be true falls 
within the system of reason. Here reason is, as Adorno puts it, (b1) ‘the totality of 
objective validities, the archetype of all objectivity’ (ND 234 / GS 6: 233).34 The 
coexistence of these two characteristics – reason’s ‘double-edged character’ 
(Doppelschlächtigkeit) (GS 6: 234) – Adorno argues, collapses objectivity into the 
subject: the subject, taking on an ontological role, is reason and anticipates all 
possible validities. That there might be objectivity in ‘anything opposed to the 
subject’ is excluded in principle (ND 234 / GS 6: 234). This places pressure, Adorno 
believes, on the very notion of ‘the objectivity of truth’ (ND 234 / GS 6: 234) since 
truth, in this model, is grounded in subjectivity alone. 
 
This dual structure of reason, Adorno argues, also manifests itself in Kant’s concept 
of the rational will. The will is said to be (a2) pure subject: only as subject, not as 
object, can it be thought of as spontaneous, not passive and reactive. Adorno also 
attempts to map the basic intention of (b1) onto the will. He suggests (b2) that the will 
takes on the role of creating objectivity. He has in mind Kant’s notion that the will of 
the practical agent makes its own objects. He writes: ‘Only the will’s a priori ontical 
nature, which is extant like a quality, permits us, without being absurd, to make the 
judgment that the will creates its objects, the actions’ (ND 235 / GS 6: 234).35 As we 
can see in the table below (fig. 1) the correlation between the objective orientation of 
theoretical and practical reason is not quite as neat as Adorno’s discussion might 
suggest. 
 
(fig. 1) Reason’s Doppelschlächtigkeit 
 Subjective objective 
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theoretical reason (a1) pure form (b1) totality of objective validities  
practical will (b1) spontaneity (b2) creates its own objects 
 
In these two distinguishable deployments of reason the agent becomes both the 
efficient – it is free of the influence of heteronomy – and formal cause of the objects: 
what is important in objects is that they can be referred back to the capacities of the 
agent. Their materiality, whether in the image of the thing-in-itself or in impulses 
which are not caused by the agent are, Adorno claims, ‘banned as heteronomous’ (ND 
235 / GS 6: 234). Because the object is understood through the actions of the agent 
the ‘differentia specifica of act and object (Gegenstand)’ (ND 238 / GS 6: 236) is 
written out of what we need to account for when we think about objectivity. 
 
Nature in Reason 
Adorno’s efforts to develop an account of reason’s autonomy are framed by the 
conclusions reached in his analysis of Kant. What that account of autonomy must 
eschew is any notion of reason as fully explicable as a causal or instrumental 
orientation towards the world; the role of materiality – the extrarational – needs to be 
accommodated in explaining the exercise of reason; the rational agent must be 
conceived as located in the world. In order to provide a theory which contains these 
elements Adorno believes that we must include, among the conditions of reason’s 
autonomy, what Kant had designated as heteronomy: i.e. nature. The challenge this 
presents is clear: the autonomy of reason can no longer be defended as a thesis about 
reason’s separation from nature, yet reason cannot be, either, wholly subject to nature. 
Reason will instead be explained, as we shall see, as a ‘dialectical’ phenomenon in 
that it is both ‘a moment of nature and yet something else’ (ND 289 / GS 6: 285).36 
And even its character as ‘something else’ is to be understood as a natural process. 
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Adorno introduces this dialectical concept through a speculative story in which (what 
look quite like) conventional ideas about the evolutionary development of human 
reason are fused with Freudian concepts about the role of the instincts in the 
development of the human being. The intellectual sphere that this theorization 
occupies is elusive. While Adorno believes that his descriptions of the development of 
reason objectively capture the phenomenon under consideration his method is 
certainly not one of science. Furthermore, Adorno may marshal a considerable 
number of Freudian concepts, but he does not take Freud’s account of the 
drives/instincts – material that is central to his own theory – as a final description of 
the human psyche (see ND 273 / GS 6: 269). Indeed, Adorno freely adjusts some of 
Freud’s conclusions, particularly when they, as Adorno sees it, fall short in 
recognizing the particular ways in which the drives are socialized (see ND 349 / GS 6: 
342). But Freud, nevertheless, is for Adorno a radical thinker whose theory amounts 
to no bourgeois ideology. Adorno believes that Freud’s drive theory does not assume 
the ultimacy of individuality. In this regard he is to be strongly differentiated from the 
neo-Freudians – Karen Horney in particular – whom Adorno accuses of ‘talking 
incessantly about the influence of society upon individuals’, without appreciating 
‘that not only the individual but the very category of individuality is a product of 
society’.37 Devoid of that insight psychoanalysis becomes ‘social conformism’.38 
 
Adorno regards freedom and reason as aspects of the one psychic phenomenon: the 
ability to think and act without reflex is at the same time a capacity to initiate in 
contrast to being caused to respond: ‘If passive reactions were all there is’, he writes, 
‘there could be no thinking’ (ND 217 / GS 6: 216).39 The emergence of 
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freedom/reason is explained by Adorno within the biological drive for self-
preservation. Somehow the very capacity for reason, as a capacity to think, has 
‘genetically evolved from the force of human drives’ (ND 230 / GS 6: 229).40 He 
claims that ‘self-preservation in its history calls for more than conditioned reflexes, 
and thus it prepares for what it would eventually transcend’ (ND 217 / GS 6: 216).41 
Conditioned reflexes, presumably, produce merely uniform responses to the same 
environmental challenges.  
 
Adorno, arguably, can find room within Freud’s theory for a developmental account 
of reason, even though Freud himself does not offer a theory of the development of 
human cognitive capacities. Notwithstanding, some broad indications in his work on 
the drives/instincts might seem to allow space within which such a theory could be 
envisaged. In ‘The Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ he identifies instinctual stimuli 
(Triebreize) as demands which cannot be met in the way that the demands of external 
stimuli are met, namely, by ‘muscular movement’. The demands of these instincts or 
drives can be addressed only by the organism’s adjustment of some feature of the 
outer world ‘to afford satisfaction to the internal source of stimulation’.42 In order to 
achieve that adjustment it seems that the organism itself must change. The need to 
satisfy the instinctual stimulus creates a dynamic for the development of the 
organism. Freud writes: 
 
We may therefore well conclude that instincts and not external stimuli are the true 
motive forces behind the advances that have led the nervous system, with its 
unlimited capacities, to its present high level of development. There is naturally 
nothing to prevent our supposing that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, 
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precipitates of the effects of external stimulation, which in the course of 
phylogenesis have brought about modifications in the living substance.43 
 
Adorno argues that there is a connection between the emergence of reason and that of 
self. Non-reflective creatures – those that operate on conditioned responses – display 
unified responses to whatever threatens them. The nature of this ‘unity’ is unclear. 
But Adorno proposes that the evolved capacities of the reflective creature – over the 
purely reflexive – ‘presumably emulates the biological individual’s prescription of the 
form of his reflexes; the reflexes scarcely would be without any unity’ (ND 217 / GS 
6: 216).44 The unity of the creature is reproduced in new form in human beings 
gaining a reflective (freedom/reason) capacity. As human beings – if, in fact, Adorno 
means human beings – moved from pure passivity and receptivity, in which self-
preservative instincts were simply activated, towards reason and freedom in which 
some kind of space exists between threat and action – notwithstanding the persistence 
of a certain conditioned reflexivity – the original unity of the instinctive ‘compulsive’ 
creature carried over into the unity of the will that is characteristic of creatures like us. 
The ‘reflective faculty’ takes possession of the challenges of self-preservation and this 
‘opens up the difference that has evolved between the self and the reflexes’ (ND 217 / 
GS 6: 216-217).45 As Adorno recognizes, it is the ego or self that Freud identifies with 
the primal drive for self-preservation (‘the self of self-preservation’ [ND 217 / GS 6: 
217]). But this acknowledgement raises a puzzling issue in Adorno’s appropriation of 
Freud’s position. Freud distinguishes between ‘the ego, or self-preservative, instincts 
and the sexual instincts’.46 He also describes the sublimation of the pleasure principle 
as ‘the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation’.47 So how then can we 
hold, as Adorno effectively does, that it is a primal act of self-preservation that 
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explains the emergence of the self? Self-preservation presupposes the self. The 
position articulated appears to be, after all, a synthesis of conventional claims about 
the development of human cognitive capacities and Freudian drive theory. 
 
Adorno does not hold that the emergent self stands, ultimately, ‘beyond nature’ (ND 
220 / GS 6: 219). Subjects are, he writes, ‘fused with their own physical nature 
(Körperlichkeit)’ (ND 221 / GS 6: 220). This contention rests on the idea that reason 
is inseparable from self-preservation. Exploiting this suggestive account of reason’s 
distinctive natural qualities Adorno rejects the two central planks of the notion of the 
autonomy of reason in the idealist sense, proposing: 
(i) reason is not independent of self-preservation (it thus has interests that are not 
typical of its supposed autonomy);  
(ii) it is not a power that is independent of nature (independent of instincts does 
not mean dualistically other than them). 
 
This quasi-Freudian model is not merely descriptive, then: it provides a critical 
standpoint from which to tackle the very idea of reason as standing outside nature. 
The mistake is to believe, as Adorno puts it, that reason ‘as the psychological force 
split off and contrasted with nature’ is ‘nature’s otherness’ (ND 289 / GS 6: 285).48 
But this is not just a philosophical mistake. It is a belief which has come to influence 
the self-understanding of individuals in modernity. As beings capable of rational 
autonomy they are directed by the ego. The implications of this self-understanding are 
manifest in how human beings act: as ego creatures they act out of self-preservation, 
though they understand themselves to be acting purely rationally. This is a profound 
misconception, Adorno argues: ‘if the nature in reason itself is forgotten, reason 
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will be self-preservation running wild and will regress to nature’ (ND 289 / GS 6: 
285).49 Self-preservation as the interest of the ego will be the exclusive drive of the 
organism.  
 
It may seem surprising that Adorno should make that charge of a regression to nature 
when he himself urges a reconsideration of the natural basis of reason. What he has in 
mind, though, is that the purely reflexive actions of natural self-preservation are 
automatic responses. In this regard they make no differentiations between 
encountered objects. Ironically, reason’s indifference to nature recapitulates the 
original indifference of the reflexes. Adorno writes that as reason ‘became 
autonomous and developed into an apparatus, thinking also became the prey of 
reification and congealed into a high-handed method’.50 It has this character because 
it refuses to define itself as differentiated in its activities or judgments by what it 
encounters. Hence his remark: ‘Detached from the object, autonomy is fictitious’ (ND 
223 / GS 6: 222). 
 
How does this materialist perspective enable us to maintain some recognizable sense 
of the thesis of reason’s autonomy? What that thesis means is that human beings have 
the capacity in some sense to control reflexive responses. Adorno tries to show – 
necessitated, perhaps, by the conceptual material to which he is committed – that it is 
only the ego itself that can take a view of our self-preservative instincts, instincts that 
rest, in the first instance with the ego. It is a process of a ‘self-reflection in thinking 
(Selbstbesinnung)’ (ND 233 / GS 6: 232) that must nevertheless also be an act of 
self-preservation. In construing reason as capable of taking a view of itself once it 
perceives its instinctive interests Adorno aligns his critical position with that of the 
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therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis. In this context reflection brings about a change 
in the individual’s conception of him/herself. Alfred Tauber provides a salient account 
of the rationality of the therapeutic process: 
 
Freud argued, on the one hand, humans are subject to unconscious activities 
(framed within a biological conception), and thus subject to a form of natural 
determinism. On the other hand, the rational faculty of the ego permits, given 
proper support and articulation, the means of both understanding the deterministic 
forces of the unconscious as well as freeing the ego from their authority. 
Psychoanalysis thus depends on an implicit notion of autonomy, whereby the 
interpretative faculty would free the analysand from the tyranny of the 
unconscious in order to pursue the potential of human creativity and freedom.51  
 
Similarly, Adorno holds that the ego can come to a view of its own tendencies: those 
which seem to impel it towards acts of violence against itself, acts that are legitimated 
by the imperatives of historical forms of self-preservation. He writes: ‘The ego 
principle is implanted in them by society, and society rewards that principle although 
it curbs it’ (ND 297 / GS 6: 292).52 The experience of this curtailment or constraint is 
what prompts therapeutic reflection. Adorno suggests that in psychoanalysis the 
‘theory of the ego as a totality of defense mechanisms and rationalizations is directed 
against the individual as ideology, against the… hubris of the self-controlled 
individual...’ (ND 352 / GS 6: 345).53 The very reality the ideological ego – the self of 
unreflecting self-preservation – can be brought into question by the ego itself. It 
seems to involve a moment in which the ego attempts to understand that the drive for 
self-preservation – which also constitutes it – is a threat (both to itself and others with 
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whom it is affectively related). The individual as ego persists in its current form by 
denying itself the prospect of that knowledge. As Adorno puts it: ‘For the sake of self-
preservation the ego must to deny itself self-consciousness always at the same time 
suspend the achievement of knowledge, which is itself to be completed by the ego for 
the sake of self-preservation’.54 What Adorno is insisting here is that the ego’s fear of 
its own destruction deflects if from knowledge, yet it is only through that knowledge 
that self-preservation can be secured. 
 
This unusual theory perhaps helps to explain a controversial feature of Adorno’s 
conception of how reason ought to be used under the conditions of current history. He 
tasks reason with the negative role of ensuring that we do not act out of the habitual 
norms that he associates with the identity thinking that culminated in the catastrophic 
events of the twentieth century. The socialized ego has understood its own health to 
be preserved solely by acting within, and perpetuating, those norms. Gaining 
awareness of the habituated norms of the socialized ego does not guarantee that one is 
no longer subject to them. For that reason a constant vigilance against the compulsion 
of those norms is what, ultimately, Adorno thinks of as rational autonomy today.55 By 
contrast, a theory of autonomy which represents human beings as operating in a space 
above the drive for self-preservation – Kant’s pre-eminently – misunderstands the 
interests of reason. In imagining itself to be pure it divests itself of self-reflection. 
 
It is worth noting, before concluding, that Adorno’s criticism of the idealist 
conception of the autonomy of reason actually conserves the terms of idealism itself. 
The freedom/nature dualism of that towering conception is not abandoned: it is 
dialectically reconstructed. Reason is both freedom and nature. Adorno’s effort to 
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convince us of that seems to be precariously conjectural. Its broad purpose, though, is 
clear enough. It is designed to address the limitations of the idealist conceptualization 
of reason’s autonomy. As self-reflection reason is not instrumentally orientated, but is 
involved in the business of self-understanding, and that self-understanding obliges us 
to take ourselves seriously as instinctual beings whose apparently most rational 
actions turn out to be marked by self-preservative interests. 
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